Kyvvu

OWASP agentic · ASI06

ASI06: Memory & Context Poisoning

Agents keep and reuse information across tasks: conversation summaries, long-term memory, embeddings and RAG stores. Attackers seed or corrupt that stored context so that later reasoning, planning or tool use becomes biased, unsafe or leaky. Unlike a one-off prompt injection, the corruption persists and can affect future sessions, other users or other agents.

What it looks like

  • Manipulated documents enter a vector store and keep surfacing false answers or embedded payloads.
  • An attacker repeats a false fact (such as a fake price or refund policy) until the assistant stores it and acts on it.
  • Indirect prompt injection writes instructions into a user's assistant memory, affecting all later sessions.

What OWASP recommends

  • Scan new memory writes for malicious or sensitive content before committing them, and only accept authenticated, curated sources.
  • Segment memory per user, tenant and domain, and minimise retention.
  • Track provenance, weight retrieval by trust, expire unverified entries and do not automatically feed the agent's own outputs back into trusted memory.
  • Keep snapshots and version control so poisoned memory can be quarantined and rolled back.

How Kyvvu's policies address it

These policies from the open library are written for this threat. Runtime policies judge each step against everything the agent did earlier in the task; registration policies check what an agent declares before it runs.

Based on the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026 by the OWASP GenAI Security Project, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. The names are OWASP's; the summaries are ours.

An example policy

External content taint: high-impact actions require a fresh gate

From the OWASP agentic default pack. Severity critical: the step is blocked before it runs.

- name: "External content taint: high-impact actions require a fresh gate"  description: |    ASI01 (Agent Goal Hijack), ASI06 (Memory & Context Poisoning),    ASI09 (Human-Agent Trust Exploitation):    If the agent has fetched external content earlier in this task,    any subsequent high-impact action (code execution, outbound message,    destructive or mutating resource call) must be IMMEDIATELY preceded    by a step.gate. A single approval at task start does not whitewash    the rest of the path - oversight must be re-confirmed AFTER external    influence has entered the context.    This addresses the EchoLeak / indirect prompt injection pattern:    malicious instructions hidden in retrieved content silently redirect    the agent's plan. By requiring fresh approval after every external    ingestion, the policy forces the human (or a downstream policy gate)    to re-validate intent before any irreversible action.    Convention: requires step.resource GETs to set the property    target.trust = "external" when fetching content from outside an    internal allowlist.    This is a path-dependent compound policy and is the headline    demonstration of "policies on paths".    Applies to: ALL agents.  rule_type: not  params:    condition:      rule_type: all_of      params:        conditions:          - rule_type: any_of            params:              conditions:                - rule_type: current_is                  params:                    kind: step.exec                - rule_type: current_is                  params:                    kind: step.message                    verb: POST                - rule_type: current_is                  params:                    kind: step.resource                    verb: POST                - rule_type: current_is                  params:                    kind: step.resource                    verb: PATCH                - rule_type: current_is                  params:                    kind: step.resource                    verb: DELETE          - rule_type: history_contains            params:              kind: step.resource              count_attempts: true              verb: GET              property_filter:                target.trust: external          - rule_type: not            params:              condition:                rule_type: step_directly_preceded_by                params:                  required_kind: step.gate  severity: critical  enforcement_point: step_execution

Your agents

Is ASI06 a risk for yours?

For security teams

Request a demo

We walk through your agents' riskiest paths, and the policies that close them.

For developers

Build the path yourself

Recreate the attack in the playground and see which policies stop it.