Policy · critical
External content taint: high-impact actions require a fresh gate
If the agent has fetched external content earlier in this task, any subsequent high-impact action (code execution, outbound message, destructive or mutating resource call) must be IMMEDIATELY preceded by a step.gate. A single approval at task start does not whitewash the rest of the path - oversight must be re-confirmed AFTER external influence has entered the context.
The policy
A few lines of YAML in your repository.
Part of OWASP agentic default. Assign the pack, or copy this policy into a manifest of your own.
- Verdict
- Critical: the step is blocked before it runs, and an incident is opened.
- Checked
- Before every step, against everything the agent did earlier in the task.
- Rule
- not
- OWASP agentic
- ASI01, ASI06, ASI09
- name: "External content taint: high-impact actions require a fresh gate" description: | ASI01 (Agent Goal Hijack), ASI06 (Memory & Context Poisoning), ASI09 (Human-Agent Trust Exploitation): If the agent has fetched external content earlier in this task, any subsequent high-impact action (code execution, outbound message, destructive or mutating resource call) must be IMMEDIATELY preceded by a step.gate. A single approval at task start does not whitewash the rest of the path - oversight must be re-confirmed AFTER external influence has entered the context. This addresses the EchoLeak / indirect prompt injection pattern: malicious instructions hidden in retrieved content silently redirect the agent's plan. By requiring fresh approval after every external ingestion, the policy forces the human (or a downstream policy gate) to re-validate intent before any irreversible action. Convention: requires step.resource GETs to set the property target.trust = "external" when fetching content from outside an internal allowlist. This is a path-dependent compound policy and is the headline demonstration of "policies on paths". Applies to: ALL agents. rule_type: not params: condition: rule_type: all_of params: conditions: - rule_type: any_of params: conditions: - rule_type: current_is params: kind: step.exec - rule_type: current_is params: kind: step.message verb: POST - rule_type: current_is params: kind: step.resource verb: POST - rule_type: current_is params: kind: step.resource verb: PATCH - rule_type: current_is params: kind: step.resource verb: DELETE - rule_type: history_contains params: kind: step.resource count_attempts: true verb: GET property_filter: target.trust: external - rule_type: not params: condition: rule_type: step_directly_preceded_by params: required_kind: step.gate severity: critical enforcement_point: step_executionWhy it matters
This addresses the EchoLeak / indirect prompt injection pattern: malicious instructions hidden in retrieved content silently redirect the agent's plan. By requiring fresh approval after every external ingestion, the policy forces the human (or a downstream policy gate) to re-validate intent before any irreversible action.
Convention: requires step.resource GETs to set the property target.trust = "external" when fetching content from outside an internal allowlist.
This is a path-dependent compound policy and is the headline demonstration of "policies on paths".
Applies to: ALL agents.
How the rule works
not: Compound rule: passes if and only if the sub-condition fails.
condition:{"rule_type":"all_of","params":{"conditions":[{"rule_type":"any_of","params":{"conditions":[{"rule_type":"current_is","params":{"kind":"step.exec"}},{"rule_type":"current_is","params":{"kind":"step.message","verb":"POST"}},{"rule_type":"current_is","params":{"kind":"step.resource","verb":"POST"}},{"rule_type":"current_is","params":{"kind":"step.resource","verb":"PATCH"}},{"rule_type":"current_is","params":{"kind":"step.resource","verb":"DELETE"}}]}},{"rule_type":"history_contains","params":{"kind":"step.resource","count_attempts":true,"verb":"GET","property_filter":{"target.trust":"external"}}},{"rule_type":"not","params":{"condition":{"rule_type":"step_directly_preceded_by","params":{"required_kind":"step.gate"}}}}]}}. A single sub-condition (dict with rule_type and params).
OWASP agentic threats it addresses
In these packs
- OWASP agentic default, version 1.0.2
From Kyvvu's open policy library at github.com/Kyvvu/manifests, Apache 2.0.
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