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Agent incident database

ForcedLeak: a web form entry made Salesforce Agentforce leak CRM data

25 Sept 2025Salesforce · Agentforcedata exfiltrationdisclosed vulnerability

Noma Security showed that instructions typed into a public web-to-lead form could later make Salesforce's Agentforce send CRM data to an attacker. The route out used a domain Salesforce still trusted but had let expire.

How it unfolded

Each step on its own looked like ordinary agent work. The harm came from the sequence.

  1. 1

    Stored a lead submitted through a public web form, with hidden instructions

  2. 2

    Read the lead record when an employee asked about it

  3. 3

    Model followed the instructions hidden in the lead

  4. 4

    Queried other CRM records, such as lead email addresses

  5. 5

    Output an image tag that sent the data to an attacker-owned, still-whitelisted domain

    harm

Which policy would have stopped this?

In our reading of the reports, these policies from the open library stop the harmful step before it runs.

Open Restrict outbound to approved domains in the playground and build the path yourself.

This is our reading of public reporting. We haven't run it against the original systems.

What happened

Noma Labs reported the chain (CVSS 9.4) to Salesforce on 28 July 2025 and disclosed it on 25 September 2025. An attacker submits a lead through Salesforce's Web-to-Lead form, placing instructions in the 42,000-character Description field, where they are stored as ordinary CRM data. When an employee later asks Agentforce about that lead, for example to draft a follow-up email, the agent processes the hidden instructions and queries other CRM data. It then outputs an HTML image tag pointing to an attacker URL with the data in a query parameter. The content security policy still allowed a domain, my-salesforce-cms.com, that had expired; the researchers bought it for about $5 so the request would pass.

Outcome

Salesforce re-secured the expired domain and on 8 September 2025 enforced Trusted URLs for Agentforce and Einstein AI so agent output cannot be sent to untrusted URLs. Salesforce told The Register it had released patches but declined to say whether the flaw had been abused.

Sources

A summary of public reporting. The step-by-step timeline is our reading of those sources; where they differ, we say so above.

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